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Getting Entangled in the Establishment Clause:
Implications of the Decision in
Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City
Matthew A. Russell*
To sell, or not to sell? That was the question before the Salt
Lake City government in the spring of 1999 and again in the winter
of 2002 when the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
("LDS Church") offered to buy a portion of land in the heart of the
city's downtown. While the actual property transactions
contemplated involved little more than a two-block piece of
property, the effects of those transactions fractionalized the city and
brought to the surface an ongoing rift between city residents
regarding the extent to which the LDS Church should influence and
participate in the city's political process.
As the following article will reveal, the Salt Lake City
government ("the City") decided to sell. What resulted was a series
of legal battles involving the LDS church, the City and the residents
of Salt Lake City. The two legal battles, First Unitarian Church of
Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp.' and Utah Gospel Mission v.
Salt Lake City Corp., involved allegations made by other religious
institutions and members of the community that the sale of the land
to the LDS church, and the subsequent sale of an easement
retained by the City on that land, violated the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution. This article will focus on the second
round of litigation in which multiple plaintiffs alleged an
Establishment Clause violation on the part of the City for
relinquishing an easement to the LDS Church. More specifically,
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law,
2006.
1. 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002).
2. 316 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Utah 2004), appeal docketed, No. 04-4113
(10th Cir. May 27, 2004).
3. The second round of litigation is the Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake
City Corp. case and will be referred to as Main Street II throughout this article.
The first round of litigation, the disposition of which led to the actions that
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this article will analyze the Establishment Clause analysis employed
by the district court in that case and show that, for a myriad of
reasons, the analysis was flawed under current - albeit confusing -
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This analysis led to an
improper dismissal of the claim challenging the City's sale of the
easement to the LDS Church.4 In evaluating the motion to dismiss
the plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim, the court in Main Street
H should have more closely addressed evidence of collusion
between church and government in the time leading up to the
transaction in this case and examined the particular context of a
governmental action that indicated a preference for - or an
endorsement of - one particular religion.
Part I of this article will give a detailed background of the
interesting dynamic in Salt Lake City and the dispute leading up to
Main Street I. Part ii will outline the current state of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in order to provide a backdrop
for the litigation analyzed herein. Part III will describe in detail the
holding and rationale of the District Court in Main Street H. Part
IV will analyze the District Court's decision in light of
Establishment Clause precedent. Part V will then serve the dual
role of (1) considering the implications that would result were the
Tenth Circuit to uphold the District Court's decision on appeal and
(2) providing a suggested analytical framework for this case and
similar litigation in order to assure that underlying First
Amendment principles endure.
I. BACKGROUND
Before one can fully appreciate the issues that follow, it is
spurred the suit in Main Street II, was First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City
v. Salt Lake City Corp. and will be referred to as Main Street I throughout this
article. The Main Street 1I case is currently on appeal in the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and oral argument is scheduled for May 4, 2005.
4. See Main Street 1!, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. The Establishment Clause
claim in this case was dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Therefore the
district court held that no Establishment Clause claim could be made based on
the facts of this case.
[Vol. 3
UTAH GOSPEL MISSION
important to understand the relationship between the LDS Church
and Salt Lake City. Salt Lake City, Utah serves as the international
headquarters for the LDS Church. Of the 11,985,254 worldwide
members of the LDS Church, approximately one-seventh reside in
Utah. More tellingly, approximately 45 percent of Salt Lake's
population is Mormon. As a result, the city government has
traditionally felt the significant presence and influence of the LDS
Church. It is within this dynamic that the dispute which is the
subject of this recent development arose.
Not only does the litigation's underlying dispute position
citizens on opposing sides of the street with regard to the
disagreement between the City and the LDS Church, but this
impasse literally divides the geography of downtown Salt Lake City.
The property at issue in these lawsuits is a two-block portion of
Main Street in the heart of downtown Salt Lake City. The LDS
Church owns property on two city blocks on the east and west sides
of this portion of Main Street,' upon which it maintains a number of
important buildings and worship facilities that constitute the
Church's international headquarters. On the west side of Main
Street is "Temple Square," which contains the Salt Lake Temple
and the Mormon Tabernacle, a magnificent building and tourist
attraction'*; the east side of the street holds the LDS Church's
5. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-clay Saints (LDS Church) is also
commonly referred to as the Mormon Church. These two terms are
interchangeable for purposes of this article.
6. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints Official Homepage, at
http://www.lds.org/newsroom/page/Ol 5606,4034-1 -10-168,00.html (last
visited Feb. 7, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review). Across
the globe, there are 26,237 LDS churches, and 5,503,192 LDS members live in
the United States. Id. The Book of Mormon is available in 104 different
languages, and 120, 175, 500 copies have been published since 1830. Id.
7. See, e.g., Heather May, Council Might Bypass Mayor, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Oct. 12, 2002, at B1 (Five of the seven members of the city council at
the time of the initial sale were members of the LDS Church; six of the seven
members of the city council at the time of the sale of the easement were
members of the LDS Church).
8. Main Street J, 308 F.3d at 1117.
9. See Main Street H, F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
10. See Main Street , 308 F.3d at 1117.
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administration buildings." Main Street, a typical public street with
unrestricted sidewalks, 2 intersects the two properties. It is an
important thoroughfare to shopping centers in the City' 3 and has
historically served as a site for public demonstration against the
LDS Church.
4
In 1998, the LDS Church expressed interest in purchasing
the section of Main Street dividing the LDS property in order to
unify their properties and create an "open-space pedestrian
plaza."' 5 In April 1999, the City decided to sell the section to the
LDS Church, but it reserved a "Pedestrian Easement."" The
retention of the easement by the City was a condition to the sale,
and the easement was to be "planned and improved so as to
11. ld. The Mormon Tabernacle is an extremely important historical
location in the history of the LDS Church. In 1847, after the first LDS
pioneers arrived, Brigham Young chose a plot of land as the spot for a temple
that would become their most sacred place of worship. Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints Official Homepage, available at
http://www.lds.org/newsroom/showpackage/0,1.5367,3899-1 -- 2-119,00.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
The temple was central to the faith of the pioneers; unlike other LDS
meetinghouses, where anyone may attend Sunday services and other meetings,
temples are open only to faithful LDS Church members for "the performance
of their highest, most sacred rites." Id. The temple was finally completed in
1893, more than forty years after construction officially began, and it remains
an important symbol of the LDS Church and a tourist attraction. Id.
12. See Main Street II, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
13. Main Street L 308 F.3d at It 19 (noting that the LDS Church
described the area as "a funnel to the Crossroads and ZCMI Center shopping
malls as well as the remainder of the downtown business district," (citing ApIt.
App. vol. IV at 1584-89)).
14. See Heather May, Street Preachers Lose Another Round, SAUL LAKE
TIBu., Dec. 22, 2004, at B2 (describing the most recent wave of protesters at
the Plaza and a district court ruling against their challenge of the City's limits
on the places where they can stand). See also, Lara Updike, Protestors to
Church Doctrine Grow, BYU NEwSNEr, Oct. 7, 2002, at
http://newsnet.byu.edu/story.cfm/40183 (describing the trip made by numerous
protestors from all over the country to protest the Mormon religion at their
General Conference each April and October).
15. Main Street , 308 F.3d at 1117-18.
16. [d. at 1118.
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maintain, encourage, and invite public use."1 7 According to members
of the city council and the Mayor, retention of this easement for
public use of the land was an essential term to the deal in the initial
sale." The easement guaranteed a right of way for the public, but
effectively granted all other control and authority over the property
to the LDS Church, including control of expressive activity on the
plaza."'
Subsequent to the sale, the LDS Church banned actions it
considered offensive, including smoking, sunbathing and "any
illegal, offensive, indecent, obscene, vulgar, lewd or disorderly
speech, dress or conduct," and reserved the right to ban anyone
who violated these rules.2 The LDS Church also altered the
physical character of the property by removing the portion of Main
Street and the sidewalks, thereby redirecting vehicle traffic around
the property and creating a brick pedestrian walkway.
Heated public controversy followed this sale and the
subsequent restrictions placed upon the property by the LDS
Church, with many members of the public and community leaders
accusing the LDS Church and the City administration of misleading
the Salt Lake City Council as to the limited scope of the easement."
In June 2000, the First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City, the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and others sued the City,
alleging violations of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.2 The District Court entered summary judgment in
favor of the City and the LDS Church, but the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision, holding that
the easement retained by the City constituted a public forum for-4
First Amendment purposes. The court held that easements are
17. Id. (citing ApIt. App. vol. III at 1220) (emphasis added).
18. Main Street IH, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1211 (D. Itah 2004) (Mayor
Rocky Anderson wrote an open letter to the public stating, "That easement
was crucial to the city at the time of the initial deal.").
19. Main Street 1, 308 F.3d at 1119-20.
20. Id.
21. Main Street II, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
22. Jd. at 1207.
23. See Main Street 1, 308 F.3d at 1114. The LDS Church intervened as a
party defendant to protect its property rights. hM. at 1117-18.
24. See id. at 1115.
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"constitutionally cognizable property interests" sufficient to be
"subject to forum analysis," and therefore the City could neither
prohibit protected speech on the easement nor grant the right to
prohibit protected speech to the LDS Church.' The City was
therefore responsible for regulating and upholding the rights
granted under the First Amendment, subject to reasonable time,
place and manner regulations.)
Following this decision, there was a dispute between the
LDS Church and the City over the status of the easement. The
LDS Church took the position that the easement was void, because
an unrestricted public easement was not what the parties intended.2
The City argued that the pedestrian easement remained after the
decision, but the regulation of expression and assembly by the LDS
Church was found unconstitutional, and therefore control over
regulation reverted back to the City. ' Consequently, the Mayor of
Salt Lake City, Rocky Anderson, spoke publicly about the need to
protect the public's interest in the Plaza in the face of pressure from
the LDS Church to convey the easement, which would effectively
remove any First Amendment protection in the area.30
Further disputes occurred between the members of the Salt
Lake City Council and the Mayor after the council took steps to
determine whether it had the authority to rewrite the terms of the
original deed and relinquish the easement to the LDS Church on its
25. d. at i1122-23. A traditional public forum is defined as "public
property that has by long tradition - as opposed to governmental designation
- been used by the public for assembly and expression. such as a public street,
public sidewalk, or public park." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1244 (7th ed.
1999). Once an area is deemed a public forum, First Amendment rights must
be upheld therein; the government may impose time, place, or manner
restrictions, but such restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. Id.
26. Main Street 1, 308 F.3d at 1132-33.
27. Main Street H, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
28. [d.
29. Jd.
30. [d. See also Michael Janofsky, Plaza Dispte in Salt Lake City Roils
Citizens Over Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2002, at A12.
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own accord, without the Mayor's approval. ' The council
subsequently authorized funds and hired its own attorney for this
purpose.32 The ensuing quarrel included charges by both the Mayor
and the city council of religious bias and conflicts of interests.'3
On December 6, 2002, Mayor Anderson released a proposal
for regulating speech on the Plaza, which narrowly defined the
easement and designated areas for demonstrating as far away from
the LDS Temple as possible., This proposal was rejected by the
Church.3' The Mayor then altered his approach and offered a
compromise, proposing a settlement whereby the city-held
easement would be completely extinguished in exchange for 2.125
acres of property currently owned by the LDS Church and $5
million.- The easement was appraised at $500,000, and the
property given by the LDS Church was appraised at $275,000. 7
The extinguishment of the easement meant that the public would
have no rights to access or pass across the Plaza, and the LDS
Church would determine when, if ever, the public would be allowed
on the property.' The plaintiffs 9 challenged the transaction in
Main Street Ii, calling the Mayor's proposal "an eleventh hour
31. Main Street l, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1210-11.
32. Id. at 1211.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1212.
35. Id.
36. d.
37. d. at 1214.
38. Id. By selling the easement to the LDS Church. the City relinquished
any property rights, giving the property in fee to the LDS Church and
therefore allowing the Church to determine if and when to allow the public on
the Plaza. Id. Because the property became privately owned, the public
forum analysis no longer applied, and the First Amendment does not reach
actions taken by the LDS Church. Id. at 1225 (citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (stating that "[g]enerally, free speech rights do not apply
to private property," and "[i]t is, of course, a commonplace that the
constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against
abridgement by government-)).
39. The full list of the plaintiffs in Main Street If includes a number of
non-LDS religious institutions and other organizations: Utah Gospel Mission.,
First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City, Shundahai Network, Utah National
Organization for Women, and Lee J. Siegel.
200o51
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decision to change horses and relinquish the easement.
4'
1
ii. LEGAL PRECEDENT- ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
Before directly addressing the specific alleged
Establishment Clause violation, it is important to understand the
appropriate legal framework under the First Amendment, which
states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion. ' ,4' From the adoption of the Bill of Rights, there has
been dispute regarding the true reach of the religion clauses of the
First Amendment. Chief Justice Burger once stated, -[c]andor
compels the acknowledgement that we can only dimly perceive the
boundaries of permissible government activity in this sensitive area
of constitutional adjudication. ,42 This statement is still applicable to
contemporary Establishment Clause doctrines, as the United States
Supreme Court has had a difficult time articulating how this clause
should be interpreted and defining the boundaries it places on
government activity.
43
40. Main Street I1, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
41. U.S. CONsr. amend. 1.
42. Martha McCarthy. Preserving the Establishment Clause: One Step
Forward and Twso Steps Back, 2001 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 271, 271 (2001) (citing
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971)).
43. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1159 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the fact that the Lemon test has not
been expressly overruled or discarded and has been invoked in recent years,
but that many justices on the current Court have expressed dissatisfaction with
the test, and at least three recent Establishment Clause cases have been
decided without reference to it). For example, when the language "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance was challenged, the Court's decision
demonstrated the varying analytical approaches of its members, as well as the
disagreement among them. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.
Ct. 2301 (2004). The majority dismissed the case for lack of standing. In
concurrence with the result, Chief Justice Rehnquist employed the coercion
test as enunciated in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). Elk Grove, 124 S.
Ct. at 2319. He distinguished the case from Lee, in which a constitutional
violation was found. Justice O'Connor preferred the use of an endorsement
test to reach the same result, but noted that had she applied the coercion test,
she would have come to the same conclusion. Justice Thomas felt that true
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The Establishment Clause was incorporated and applied to
the state governments through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Everson v. Board of Education in 1947.
The majority in Everson attempted to establish an analytical
framework for Establishment Clause cases, promoting a "wall of
separation" between church and state.' Subsequent Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has been far less clear, producing three
different tests - the "Lemon test, 46 the "endorsement test, ' 47 and
the "coercion test.
48
adherence to Lee would require the Court to find the Pledge of Allegiance
language unconstitutional, but he called for overturning Lee (and the coercion
test used therein) as wrongly decided and advocated reading the
Establishment Clause as a federalism provision, designed to protect states
from federal interference but not protecting any individual right. Id. at 2330-
31. See also Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 399 (1993) (wherein the majority applied the Lemon test and concluded
that the Establishment Clause was not violated, and where Justice Scalia
concurred in the judgment but called for overruling the Le/non test); Supreme
Court Cases, 1996 Term: Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 279 (1997)
("Decisions under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment reflect
the Supreme Court's failure to transform the Clause's underlying principles
into the stuff of manageable standards, and thus are notoriously
inconsistent."); Robert M. O'Neill, Who Says You Can't Pray?, 3 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 347, 349 (1996) ("The boundaries of permissible activity under the
Establislmlent Clause remain elusive in many important areas."); Laura
Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WN1. & MARY L. REV.
837. 838 (1995) (describing the Court's Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause precedent as "jurisprudence of complex. conflicting, and often
undulating principles"); id. at 848 (describing Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause precedent as a "body of jurisprudence of perhaps unparalleled
contradiction and confusion").
44. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1.947) (upholding the constitutionality of a New Jersey
statute that authorized local authorities to reimburse parents for
transportation costs incurred by busing their children to public or parochial
schools).
45. Id.
46. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
47. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See also County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,592 (1989).
48. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). The Coercion Test is the most
recent Establishment Clause test promulgated by the Court and was not
employed by the court in this litigation and thus is not discussed further
200o51
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A. Lemon Test
The initial struggle to find a standard for applying the
Establishment Clause culminated in the Court's decision in Lemon
v. Kurtzman.4 ) The Court combined earlier precedent and held that
a governmental act does not violate the Establishment Clause if (1)
it has a secular purpose, (2) its primary effect neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and (3) it does not foster an excessive
entanglement of church and state. This test illustrates the
purposes of the Establishment Clause and the relevant
considerations. It reflects the separationist viewpoint of the Court,
which warns against "the three main evils against which the
Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection:
'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity.""'
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that there be a
secular purpose for the law. Case law under this prong seems to
indicate that as long as there is any secular purpose for the
governmental action, this prong will be satisfied, even if there are
other, possibly religious purposes.52
herein. The test was first stated by Justice Kennedy in County of Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part):
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any
religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of
avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct
benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact
'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends
to do so.' These two principles, while distinct, are not
unrelated, for it would be difficult indeed to establish a
religion without some measure of more or less subtle
coercion.
Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678). Under the Coercion Test, an
Establishment Clause violation arises when a governmental action "coerces"
an individual to espouse a belief in a particular doctrine. id.
49. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
50. Jd.
51. Jd. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
52. See Wallace v. Jaffrec, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (holding a law that
[Vol. 3
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The second prong of the test requires that the principal or
primary effect of a law must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion. This prong has been used to find a First
Amendment violation when a "statute goes beyond having an
incidental or remote effect of advancing religion," and where "[tihe
statute has a primary effect that impermissibly advances a
particular religious practice." Another attempt at defining the
scope of this prong stated that "[a] law is not unconstitutional
simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their
very purpose. For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it
must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion
through its own activities and influence."
The third prong forbids government actions that cause
excessive entanglement with religion. The Court in Lemon said
that a law violates the establishment clause when it requires a
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance.''" The Court has also said that "apart from any
specific entanglement of the State in particular religious programs,
assistance [to nonpublic educational institutions] carries grave
potential for entanglement in the broader sense of continuing
political strife over aid to religion.",5' The entanglement prong has
been regarded in the past as arguably the most important, but has
been criticized for lacking concreteness.
authorized public school teachers to hold a one-minute period of silence for
meditation or voluntary prayer unconstitutional because it "was not motivated
by any clearly secular purpose - indeed, the statute had no secular purpose").
See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 433 (1961) (acknowledging "the
strongly religious origin of these laws" requiring businesses to close on
Sunday, but found the laws permissible because there were some viable
secular purposes -for example, giving citizens a uniform day of rest).
53. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor. Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985).
54. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327. 337 (1987).
55. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
56. Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756.
794 (1973). See also infra text accompanying note 136.
57. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses:
The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1392 (1981):
'Entanglement' is 'such a blurred, indistinct, and
20051
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The Lemon Test has come under attack in recent decisions.
Justice Scalia likened the test to "[a] ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried ..... He continued,
[it is there to scare us ... when we wish it to do
so, but we can command it to return it to the
tomb at will. When we wish to strike down a
practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we wish
to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it
entirely."
Typically, the Justices favoring strict separation between the
government and religion favor the Lemon test, or at least its
purpose and rationale; those in favor of a more accommodationist
approach are opposed to the test. 5 The Lemon test is technically
still good law; courts, including the district court in Main Street H,
have employed it in recent years.
B. Endorsement Test
Skepticism regarding the Lemon test led to an alteration of
the analysis of Establishment Clause claims. In a concurring
opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,"' Justice O'Connor first articulated
the "endorsement test."'" Justice O'Connor "effectively collapsed
the first two prongs of the Lemon Test into one consolidated
inquiry: Does the governmental action symbolically endorse or
variable' term that it is useless as an analytical tool.
Sometimes it seems to mean contact, or the opposite of
separation: it has also been used interchangeably with
'involvement' and 'relationship.' Sometimes it seems
to mean anything that might violate the religion
clauses.
Id. (citations omitted).
58. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384.
398-99 (1993) (internal citations omitted) (Scalia, J., concurring).
59. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 1159.
60. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
61. [d. at 687-94 (1984) (O'Conner, J., concurring).
[Vol. 3
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disapprove of religion?"' - Under this test, the government is acting
impermissibly if its conduct has "either (1) the purpose or (2) the
effect of conveying a message that religion or a particular religious
belief is favored or preferred." ' 3
Through application of this test, the U.S. Supreme Court
has given some guidance as to what constitutes endorsement of
religion. "Endorsement" has been defined as sending "a message
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community."6 4 The standard articulated by the Justice O'Connor in
her concurrence in Wallace v. .Jaffree 6 5 is: "whether an objective
observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute, would perceive [the government
action] as a state endorsement of [religion].66  The endorsement
test is ultimately concerned with "enforcing governmental
neutrality toward religion and preventing the estrangement and
alienation of religious dissidents or nonadherents from the political
community by a governmental endorsement of religion that sends a
message that 'they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community.'" This neutrality principle has been used recently by
68
the Court in Establishment Clause cases.
62. Charles G. Warren, Comment, No Need to Stand on Cerenionv: The
Corruptive Influence of Ceremonial Deism and the Need for a Separationist
Reconfiguration of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,
54 MERCERL. REV. 1669,1681 (2003).
63. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 551 (10th Cir. 1997). See
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (holding that a "preference"
for particular beliefs constitutes an endorsement of religion); Sch. Dist. of
Abbington Township v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (holding that the "[t]he fullest realization of true religious liberty
requires that government ... effect no favoritism among sects or between
religion and nonreligion.. .").
64. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
66. Id. at 76.
67. Warren, supra note 62. at 1682 (citing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60, Iynch,
465 U.S. at 688).
68. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995). See
20051
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Currently, all three tests are still good law, but there is
uncertainty as to which test will be applied by the courts in a given
Establishment Clause case. More confusingly, hybrid tests
combining various elements of the above tests have also been
employed by courts in analyzing alleged violations of the
Establishment Clause.7" The failure of courts to clearly identify an
optimal test has led to both dispute among the members of the U.S.
Supreme Court' and to inconsistent decisions in the lower courts.
2
This lack of clear Establishment Clause precedent proves
problematic to courts both in properly selecting a test under which
to analyze Establishment Clause claims and also in properly
conducting the relevant Establishment Clause analysis under the
also Bd. of Educ. v. Grurnet, 512 U.S. 687. 703 (1994) (stating that "a principle
at the heart of the Establishment Clause" is that "government should not
prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion"): Daniel 0. Conkle,
The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to
Formal Neutralit , and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 21 (2000) (stating
that "formal neutrality has become the dominant theme in the Supreme
Court's doctrine").
69. See supra note 43. See also McCarthy, supra note 42, at 271 ("It
appears that the Court is heading down two divergent paths in interpreting
Establishment Clause restrictions on government action.").
70. See,. e.g., Main Street IL1 316 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1235-36 (D. Utah 2004).
71. See,. e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753 (1995). In Capitol Square, Justice O'Connor used a "symbolic
endorsement" test "from the perspective of a hypothetical observer who is
presumed to possess a certain level of information that all citizens might not
share." and was joined by Justices Souter and Breyer. Id. at 780. Justices
Stevens and Ginsberg dissented, preferring instead a symbolic endorsement
test applied from the perspective of a reasonable passerby. Justice Scalia,
writing for the plurality, rejected the use of the endorsement test at all under
these facts. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 1149-55 (describing the
three major competing approaches - strict separation, neutrality, and
accommodation/equality - and the use of each by various justices in various
cases).
72. Compare Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir.
1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995) (holding that student-led prayer violated
the secular purpose prong of Lemon) with Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch.
Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993) (holding
that student-led prayer at graduation had the secular purpose of
"solemnization" of the occasion).
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test ultimately chosen. This was precisely the problem that plagued
the court in Main Street H.
III. MAIN STIREE" LII
The plaintiffs alleged that the City's sale of the pedestrian
easement did not result from an arms-length negotiation - rather,
the sale was due to the excessive involvement, pressure and bias
brought by the LDS Church upon the city government and the
Mayor and therefore violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 3 The plaintiffs charged that
the City acquiesced to the LDS Church's
demands that the City abandon the easement,
and thus it created an exclusive and uniquely
powerful platform for the Church to
promulgate its message on a range of social,
political, and religious issues, while prohibiting
Plaintiffs and others from sharing their own
messages on the same issues in the same place
74
and in the same manner.
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that
the City's actions violate the Establishment
Clause because those actions (a) have the
purpose and effect of promoting religion, and,
in this case, a particular religion; (b)
impermissibly entangle church and state by
giving the Church authority over an open-space
pedestrian plaza in the heart of downtown Salt
Lake City; and (c) impermissibly endorse
religion by conveying a message to those who
are not LDS that they are outsiders who are
not full members of their political community.
7
73. Main Street H, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
74. Id. at 1219.
75. Id. The district court first held that the public forum had indeed been
relinquished, and that the ability to control First Amendment expression and
assembly was valid, as the property was private, not public property. d. at
1235. This result is questionable under public forum analysis, but not subject
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In analyzing the Establishment Clause claims brought by
the plaintiffs, the district court began its analysis by citing Tenth
Circuit precedent, which says the Lemon test "remains the starting
point for the court's Establishment Clause analysis." However,
the court supplemented the Lemon analysis starting point with
parts of O'Connor's endorsement test, so that the ultimate test used
by the district court was a hybrid one, employing "both the purpose
and effect components of the refined endorsement test, together
with the entanglement criterion imposed by Lemon.",7 Therefore,
the final test used by the court asked three separate questions: did
the sale by the City have either (1) the purpose, or (2) the effect of
conveying a message that religion or a particular religious belief is
favored or preferred, and (3) did the sale create excessive
entanglement between the City and the LDS Church? 7" The district
court eventually held that the City's sale of the easement (1) did not
have the purpose of advancing religion, (2) did not have the
primary effect of advancing or endorsing religion, and (3) did not
constitute entanglement."
The court first analyzed the purpose prong of the
endorsement test and held that there were sufficient secular
to discussion herein. See, e.g., Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. Local Joint
Exec. Bd., 257 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a public forum is created
when the private property owner is performing the public function of
maintaining public sidewalks, and the property is no longer truly private). The
Venetian Casino. in Las Vegas, NV, was located on Las Vegas Boulevard (the
"Strip"), and a road-widening project would require that the public sidewalk
be removed, and Venetian's land was needed for the sidewalk. Id. The
Venetian negotiated to enter an easement agreement with the State to grant
an easement for public use. Id. Demonstrations ensued, and the Venetian
tried to restrict the demonstrators; it then sought a declaratory judgment that
the sidewalk was not a public forum. Id. The court held that it was a public
forum, and the Venetian - despite it being private property - could not restrict
access or First Amendment rights Id.
76. Main Street II, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1235-36 (quoting Summum v. City
of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995. 1010 (10th Cir. 2002)).
77. Id. See also Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 552 (10th Cir.
1997) (employing a hybrid test similar to that used in Main Street It).
78. Main Street Il, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1235-36.
79. [d. at 1235-45. The court therefore granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the Establishment Clause claim. Id.
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purposes in this case to satisfy this "fairly low hurdle.""' In
evaluating the government's purpose, the court's inquiry "should be
deferential and limited" where the government has articulated a
reasonable secular purpose.8' The court in this case listed many
purposes, which were set forth in a 2003 Ordinance by the City
Council that showed there was a valid secular purpose for the sale.
Further, the City received a substantial amount of money for the
property, meaning that even if the other purposes did not suffice,
the economic advantage was itself a secular purpose sufficient to
satisfy this prong.'3
The court next analyzed the effect prong of the
endorsement test." The court held as a matter of law, "the sale of
the Easement did not constitute City 'sponsorship,' 'financial
support,' or 'active involvement' in LDS Church affairs, and no
reasonable observer aware of the circumstances of the sale...
could conclude that the sale of the Easement constituted City
endorsement of the LDS Church.",15  Important to the court's
decision was that the City had not given anything away to the
Church, but instead received a substantial amount of money and a
80. Id. at 1236-37 (citing Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food
Control. 66 F.3d 1337. 1345 (4th Cir. 1995)).
81. Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 554 (quoting Wallace v. .affree, 472 U.S. 38,
74 (1985) (O'Connor,.I., concurring)).
82. Main Street 1I, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. Secular purposes included
(1) resolving the legal dispute over the Pedestrian
Easement between the City and the Church and
bringing an end to the divisiveness in the community;
(2) eliminating the City's unintended responsibility
created by the Tenth Circuit's decision to regulate
protected expressive activities on the Main Street
Plaza, with the attendant risk of litigation; (3) enabling
the City to construct new and expanded facilities on
the Glendale Property that would provide significant
benefits to the community. and (4) promoting tourism
and economic development.
Id.
83. Id. (noting that "the City obtained nearly $5.4 million in value for
giving up an Easement appraised at $500,000").
84. Id. at 1240.
85. Id. at 1241.
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plot of land in exchange for the easement and that the sale ended a
potentially expensive legal dispute between the City and the LDS
Church."' The Church had also altered the physical appearance of
the Main Street property, creating a plaza with street lights, garbage
cans, large plants and stone structures at the entrances, and
distinctive pavement and landscaping.17  Because of these
alterations, the court reasoned that a member of the public would
not reasonably conclude that the Plaza is government property."8
The court then examined the issue of entanglement between
the LDS Church and the City. The court limited its discussion of
this aspect to one short paragraph,' stating that the "sale of the
Easement actually eliminated the likelihood of excessive
entanglement between the Church and the City," and that "[s]elling
the Pedestrian Easement to the Church eliminated the need for
coordination between the Church and the City in the management
of the Plaza." '
The court thus held that the plaintiffs did not state a claim
under the Establishment Clause and granted the LDS Church's and
the City's motions to dismiss."
IV. ANALYSIS - MAIN STREET I
The most troublesome aspect of the court's decision in Main
Street II is the court's failure to adequately analyze and give proper
weight to the evidence of collusion between the LDS Church and
the City. The principles of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
listed below should dictate that this evidence is worthy of further
consideration by the court. This lack of weight given to evidence of
collusion manifested itself in two aspects of the decision: 1) the
analysis of the primary effect of the sale of the easement based on
the perception of the public, and 2) the analysis of the level of
86. Id. at 1241-42.
87. Id. at 1242-43.
88. [d. at 1242.
89. [d. at 1244-45.
90. [d.
91. [d. at 1247.
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entanglement between the City and the Church.
A. PRIMARY EFFECT Prong of the Endorsement Test
In examining the primary effect of the sale of the easement
to the LDS Church, the court relied heavily on the physical
appearance of the plaza and placed relatively little weight on the
public's impressions resulting from the sale.)' The court stated its
test as an objective one, "not an inquiry into whether particular
individuals might be offended by the City's actions or consider
them to endorse religion." 93 As the court stated, this test "should
evaluate whether a 'reasonable observer,' aware of the history and
context of the community in which the conduct occurs, would view
the practice as communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval." 14 Furthermore, "the resulting
advancement need not be material or tangible. An implicit
symbolic benefit is enough,,1 5 and "the mere appearance of a joint
exercise of legislative authority by Church and State provides a
significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some by
92. See id. at 1240-46.
93. Id. at 1241 (citing Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 552
(1997)).
94. Main Street II, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (quoting Bauchman, 132 F.3d
at 551-52 (citing Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 778-81 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring))). This appears to be the more
stringent of the possible standards - the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has held that "when we find that a reasonable person could perceive
that a government action conveys the message that religion or a particular
religious belief is favored or preferred, the Establishment Clause has been
violated." Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d
487. 493 (2000) (citing Capitol Square. 515 U.S. at 778 (O'Connor, J..
concurring) (emphasis added)); see also supra notes 6-7 and accompanying
text (describing the unique dynamic and context in which this litigation arose).
The court's analysis is particularly troubling, given that a reasonable observer,
armed with the knowledge of this dynamic in Salt Lake City, would be more
likely to see the sale of the easement as a communication of government
endorsement of the LDS Church or at least continued complacency with the
dominating hand of the LDS Church in the City government. The court does
not directly address this "history and context of the community."
95. Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d. 777, 781 (1985) (citing
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 125 (1982)).
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reason of the power conferred. "',
When evaluating the effect of the relinquishment of the
easement, the court analyzed the "circumstances of the sale," but
restricted its analysis to those circumstances other than the message
sent to the public. The court did not touch upon the evidence of
public opinion and perception of the relinquishment of the
easement." After listing these limited circumstances, the court
reached the conclusion that "[t]he primary effect of the transaction
was neither to promote nor endorse religion."9 If the true inquiry
is how a "'reasonable observer,' aware of the history and context of
the community in which the conduct occurs, would view the
practice as communicating a message of government endorsement
or disapproval,""' the court needed to take into account all history
and context of the community and the controversy, which includes
the prior litigation, the public outcry, and the actions of the City
Council and Mayor of Salt Lake City.""
96. Larkin. 459 U.S. at 125-26 (emphasis added).
97. See Main Street If. 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1241. The court lists as
circumstances of the sale
the potential for another legal battle over the validity
of the Pedestrian Easement after the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Main Street 1, the unintended responsibility
imposed on the City after Main Street I, the Tenth
Circuit's suggestion that the City resolve this issue by
extinguishing the Easement, the historic presence of
LDS Church property in the center of the City, the fact
that Main Street Plaza is surrounded on both the east
and the west sides by LDS Church-owned property,
the change in appearance of the Plaza as compared to
the public sidewalks, and the need for improvements
on the City's west side.
Id.
98. See id.
99. [d. at 1242.
100. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 551-52 (1997) (citing
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,778-81 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
101. See generally Janofsky, supra note 30 (discussing public reaction to
both the initial sale of the property and the prospect of the Mayor
relinquishing the public easement and thereby giving up public access to the
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Following the Tenth Circuit's decision in Main Street I,
Mayor Rocky Anderson entered into a dispute with the LDS
Church that he felt "threatened to tear the City apart along
religious lines."'" The Mayor was wholeheartedly in favor of
retaining the easement for the City following the decision in Main
Street I: "My job is to do the right thing. To ask me to convey that
easement from the city to the LDS Church would be a huge
betrayal to the people in this community.
The Mayor even addressed the issue of public perception
when he stated, "[i]f [a candidate for Mayor] promised to return
[the easement to the Church,] they would get 5% of the vote. Even
LDS Church members would see through that - No. I as pandering,
and No. 2 as being completely unethical."' (4 The Mayor took the
initial stance that the city had a commitment to community to
create time, place and manner restrictions over the easement
regarding expression and conduct, as opposed to relinquishing it,
and therefore rejected an LDS Church's proposal to abandon the
Easement.
1 5
After the Mayor declared this position, the City Council
took steps to determine if it could bypass the Mayor and make its
own decision."" This led to a highly-publicized dispute between the
Mayor and the City Council, prompting the Mayor to accuse the
City Council of religious bias.' ° The Mayor also stated that it was
"very clear to this community' that the Council would not have
taken such steps to deprive the community of the right of access to
the Plaza if it was owned by someone other than the LDS Church,"
and that the LDS Church used "unfair 'pressure to bear' on the all-
plaza).
102. Main Street f1. 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
103. Janofsky, supra note 30.
104. Main Street 11, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
105. Id. at 1210.
106. Id. at 1210-11. See also supra text accompanying notes 32-34;
Heather May, Council Might Bypass Mayor, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 12, 2002,
at B1.
107. Main Street U, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 ("Mayor Anderson often
repeated his allegations of bias and defended his position as the more
lobjective voice in the dispute because the seven-member alI-LDS City
Council has vast conflicts of interests.'").
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LDS Council."'" Further, the Mayor wrote an open letter to the
public, saying "[t]hat easement was crucial to the city at the time of
the initial deal .... I am being criticized by the officials of The
Church of Jesus Christ and [former Mayor] Deedee Corradini for
refusing to significantly alter a contract negotiated, drafted, and
signed by them.""" The Mayor further notes in the letter that the
parties agreed that in the instance that the restrictions were found
unconstitutional, the easement would remain in the hands of the
City. HO
All of this information has direct relevance to the public
perception of religious endorsement as a result of the sale, and all
was summarily left out of the analysis of the district court."' The
Mayor was strongly - and publicly - opposed to the relinquishment
of the easement; therefore, a reversal of this position certainly had
the potential to raise questions in the public mind as to both the
influence of the LDS Church on the Mayor and the perception of
the City government's endorsement of the LDS Church.
As for public opinion, following the Tenth Circuit's decision
in Main Street I, a poll of Salt Lake City citizens showed that almost
half of residents wanted First Amendment freedom on the Main
Street Plaza (as opposed to relinquishment of the easement), while
thirty-nine percent said control should remain in the hands of the
plaza's owner (the LDS Church)."2 More importantly,
approximately 70 percent of those who identified themselves as
non-LDS were in favor of free expression "on sidewalks of the
plaza that was a Main Street thoroughfare three years ago," while
nearly two-thirds of members of the LDS Church were in favor of
allowing the Church to restrict expression."' Only 17 percent of
non-LDS members said they would cede the right to restrict
expression to the Church."4
108. Id. at 1211.
109. Id. at 1211-12.
110. Id. at 1212.
111. See id. at 1240-44.
112. Tribune Poll: Half of Salt Lake City Says Keep Plaza Free, SALT





Letters to the Editor of the Salt Lake City Tribune were
even more revealing. One Salt Lake resident wrote:
After living in Utah the past five years, 1 should
be acclimated to the fact that the LDS Church
likes to run our lives, but I continue to be
amazed.... When are the people of Utah going
to wake up and acknowledge that there is a
reason for separation of church and state?
When will politicians realize that businesses
and individuals may not want to come to Utah
because the LDS Church tries to impose its
religious beliefs on all the people?"'
Another unnamed resident described the sequence of
events from his viewpoint, clearly indicating that this transaction
between the City and the LDS Church emitted the perception of
coercion between the two parties and a government that was
favoring the LDS Church.
What of the rights that most Salt Lakers
thought they were retaining in the sale? The
church, in its presentations to the city Planning
Commission and to the public, had represented
that the plaza would be open to the public like
a park. But when the Planning Commission's
conditions on the sale were presented to the
City Council for adoption, that guarantee had
been replaced by the easement and its
restrictions, which were negotiated by church
and city attorneys virtually on the eve of their
adoption.... It also explains why many Salt
Lakers will rightfully feel twice betrayed if
Anderson agrees to give away the public
easement and the constitutional rights that go
with it."6
Further, the purpose of the initial retention of the land was
115. Vicki Boyer, Editorial. LDS Control, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 16,
2002, at A8.
116. Plaza's Web of Grievances. SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 16, 2002, at A8.
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to benefit Salt Lake City and the public:
The City's stated purposes for promoting and
approving the overall project were to increase
usable public open space in the downtown area,
encourage pedestrian traffic generally,
stimulate business activity, and provide a buffer
closed to automobile traffic between the
residential area to the north of the plaza and
the business areas to the south ... The
easement has particular public importance for
the City because of the role the City envisioned
the easement playing in the character and
development of downtown Salt Lake City.
While the City wanted to close down the street
to automobile traffic, it simultaneously wanted
to preserve and indeed encourage pedestrian
traffic. The easement through the plaza was
specifically retained in order to preserve and
enhance the pedestrian grid in the
downtown.... As the City itself asserts, the
easement was a necessary means of
accomplishing these public purposes even as it
sold the underlying property to the LDS
Church.1
7
If the overall purpose of the project was to improve the
public space and the downtown by encouraging pedestrian traffic,
the relinquishment of the easement undermines the purpose of the
initial sale. The LDS Church now possesses all rights to exclude
from their property whomever they so choose." ', While the public is
generally allowed to walk through the property owned by the
Church,", the Church is not required to maintain that access. With
117. Main Street 1, 308 F.3d 1114. 1126 (10th Cir. 2002) (emphasis
added).
118. Main Street JJ, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1201. 1216-17 (D. Utah 2004).
119. See Brady Snyder, Judge to Rule on Plaza Suit: ACLU Says Site Still




the knowledge that the entire purpose of this overall project was to
benefit the public and provide public space,'2 relinquishment of this
essential easement surely raises a question as to whether the LDS
Church has been shown preferential treatment. Taking all of this
evidence into account, there appears to be strong public opinion
that the easement should not have been relinquished, and that
doing so was for the benefit of the LDS Church. These actions
communicate to a "'reasonable observer,' aware of the history and
context of the community in which the conduct occurs," a message
of government endorsement or approval. 2' The relevant facts of
this case seem to be at odds with the court's decision that, as a
matter of law, the circumstances of the sale did not have the effect
of endorsing religion.
B. ENTANGLEMENT Prong of the Lemon Test
Addressing the issue of entanglement, the Court made only
a very brief statement, holding that
the sale of the Easement actually eliminated
the likelihood of excessive entanglement
between the Church and the City. Following
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Main Street I,
the City was in the constitutionally awkward
position of having to regulate a public forum in
the middle of LDS Church's Main Street Plaza.
Selling the Pedestrian Easement to the Church
[The] Church's own estimates show 30 million people
use the plaza yearly to eat lunch, cut across an
otherwise closed block or to access Temple Square.
Few, if any, get church permission before entering the
Main Street Plaza. [The ACLIJ attorney] said, the
plaza functions just like it did before the city traded its
public access easement on the plaza to the [LDS
Church].
Id.
120. Main Streei [, 308 F.3d at 1126.
121. See Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 551-52 (1997) (citing




eliminated the need for coordination between
the Church and the City in the management of
the Plaza. Thus entanglement is not an issue."
This analysis appears incomplete given the precedent
regarding the Entanglement doctrine, the purposes for which it was
created and the particular facts of this case.
The entanglement prong of the Lemon test involves both
administrative and political entanglement sections.' The court in
Main Street I (as seen in the paragraph above) limited its analysis
solely to the likelihood of administrative entanglement, declining to
analyze the issue of political entanglement.' 24 While the Court's
analysis of the administrative entanglement between the LDS
Church and the City may be incomplete under the facts of the
case, for the purposes of this recent development, the analysis of
122. Main Street It. 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1244-45.
123. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 IJ.S. 602, 622-24 (1971). See generally
David R. Scheidemantle, Political Entanglement as an Independent Test of
Constitutionality Under the Establishment Clause, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1.209
(1984) (advocating the use of the political entanglement aspect of the Lemon
test be treated as the other parts and be an independent test for a
constitutional violation).
124. Main Street JI, F. Supp. 2d at 1244-45.
125. In discussing administrative entanglement, the United States
Supreme Court has held
the factors we use to assess whether an
entanglement is 'excessive' are similar to
the factors we use to examine 'effect.' That
is, to assess entanglement, we have looked
to 'the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefited, the nature of
the aid that the State provides, and the
resulting relationship between the
government and religious authority.'
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615
(1971)).
The Main Street II court claimed that the relinquishment of the easement
to the Church would decrease the level of interaction between the LDS
Church and the City, but there is evidence that this factual conclusion may be
incorrect. Following the City's decision to sell the public easement to the LDS
Church, protesters (who had routinely come to protest outside of the LDS
Church prior to the sale) became determined to test the Plaza rules and the
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the relevance of the political entanglement prong of the test is the
more salient inquiry.
As a second part of the entanglement prong, the political
entanglement test examines whether the challenged governmental
action has the potential for dividing members of the voting public
or the legislature according to their religious differences. 1 Upon
inception of the doctrine, the Court wrote that "political division
along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the
First Amendment was intended to protect. 32  According to one
commentator, "[t]he political and administrative entanglement tests
seek to prevent a 'fusion of governmental and religious
functions."' 2" The political strand of the entanglement inquiry
authority of the LDS Church by "evangeliz[ing] outside Temple Square
[during the Church's General Conference], possibly on the plaza itself."
Brandon Griggs, Preachers Plan to Test Plaza Rules at Con ference, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Oct. 4. 2003, at B6. Protesters, also deemed "street preachers." did
indeed venture to the Plaza during the Conference, and the result was at least
one altercation with attendees of the Conference. "Street preachers waved
women's religious garments and shouted insults at LDS General
Conferencegoers on Sunday. angering at least two attendees, who were
arrested when they tried to take the clothing away from the protesters."
Rhina Guidos, Two Conference Goers Arrested in Run-ins, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Oct. 6, 2003, at D2.
This course of events led the City to take action, by adopting "speech
rules limiting the places where preachers can stand and sermonize during the
church's twice-annual worldwide conferences." These free speech zones were
challenged and upheld by a U.S. district court judge. Heather May. Street
Preachers Lose Another Round. SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 22, 2004, at B2. For
purposes of analyzing administrative entanglement, it does not appear as
though the court's assertion in Main Street If is entirely accurate. This
decision has necessitated City involvement in the administration of the LDS
Church's semi-annual Conference and furthered restrictions on speech by
non-LDS members. It also has required use of the resources of a court to
resolve this issue. Therefore, the Main Street II court's treatment of this issue
appears to have increased the involvement of the two parties. This result at
minimum calls into question the brevity used by the court in Main Street II
regarding this issue.
126. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-24.
127. I. at 622 (citing Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969)).
128. See Scheidemantle, supra note 123, at 1218 (citing Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116. 126-27 (1982)).
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"guards against religious institutions' interference with the political
process,' 2') and the Court has based the test "on the premise that
political division along religious lines results in dangerous
interference by religion with the affairs of government."131 This
religious influence is seen as dangerous because "such interference
allows religious groups constituting a majority or those with
superior resources to exert excessive influence over the political
process.""'
While this is an important part of the entanglement analysis,
the Supreme Court has never invalidated a statute solely because it
violated the political entanglement test.' 2 In more recent years, the
political entanglement doctrine has been relatively disregarded and
unused,"3 but the danger it sought to avoid still remains an
important consideration when analyzing both entanglement and the
primary effect of governmental action."" This prong of the test has
also been used as a means to garner stricter scrutiny under the
other three tests of Lernon.'35
Despite the trend toward the extinction of the political
entanglement doctrine, the facts of Main Street H present a
129. Id. at 1219 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1221 (citing School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963): Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962): Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1.947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
1132. Id. at 1210-11.
133. See Mitchell v. Helms. 530 U.S. 793. 825 (2000) ("The dissent
resurrects the concern for political divisiveness that once occupied the Court
but that post-Aguilar cases have rightly disregarded.").
134. See Scheidemantle, supra note 123, at 1211 ("[S]uch [political]
division [along religious lines] is not only a danger in its own right, but a
symptom of a greater danger: the fusion of governmental and religious
functions.").
135. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349. 365 n.15 (1975) ("While the
prospect of such divisiveness may not alone warrant the invalidation of state
laws that otherwise survive the careful scrutiny required by the decisions of
this Court, it is certainly a 'warning signal' not to be ignored.") (citing Comm.
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973)).
See also Scheidemantle, supra note 123, at 1211 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12, at 866 (1978)).
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compelling case for utilizing at least the underlying principle behind
the Court's decision, especially since the district court chose to
include the entanglement prong as part of its standard. The
principle that a church should not be so involved in a governmental
action as to foster political division along religious lines or to
effectuate a "fusion" of functions is also consistent with much of the
rationale behind the Endorsement Test and the neutrality
principles discussed above - that government should not send a
message of a preference for a particular religion."6 Therefore, the
foregoing discussion could be couched in terms of "political
entanglement" or as further evidence of a preference for a religion
as proscribed by the Endorsement Test.
The dispute over the City's sale of the property and of their
later decision to relinquish the easement should have been taken
into account when examining the entanglement between the City
and the LDS Church. Beyond the opinion of the general public as
cited above, the sale of the easement had a further effect on other
members of the community.' The bishop of the Episcopal Diocese
of Utah said,
[i]t's not that we feel inferior, but periodically,
we do feel powerless, like we don't have a
voice. Decisions are made you have no part of.
Their power is always there, in your face, and
every time a power situation comes up,
emotions run high and the situation becomes
volatile. "'
Referring to the perceived influence of the Church on the
city government, a minister at the First Unitarian Church of Salt
Lake City13 stated, "It's a sad reality. It's exactly how the town
votes on things, along religious lines. Here, voting Democrat or
136. See supra section 1IB and text accompanying notes 60-68.
137. See, e.g., Janofsky, supra note 30 (reporting that the "the plaza
conflict has driven a wedge through city government and adding to a common
perception that Utah's largest religious organization wields excessive influence
over every aspect of life").
138. d.
139. The First Unitarian Church was a plaintiff in the initial lawsuit,
Main Street I. See Main Street L, 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002).
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Republican is superfluous. People vote by Mormon or non-
Mormon.'' This sort of religious line-drawing is precisely the
danger that is sought to be prevented by the political entanglement
doctrine, and it is a particular concern given the unique setting of
Salt Lake City and the relationship between the LDS Church and
the City.4
In light of the large population of LDS Church members
and the other facts of this case, the sale of both the Main Street
property and the easement are governmental actions that caused
political line-drawing and sent the message that a particular religion
is favored.143 The most glaring evidence of this effect is the precise
danger which is targeted by the political entanglement doctrine - a
split in governmental voting along religious lines. In voting on the
proposal for the initial sale of the Main Street property in 1999, the
City Council voted in favor of the sale by a five-to-two vote. The
five "yes" votes came from members of the LDS Church; the two
"no" votes were from non-Mormons.14 After the controversy that
led up to the decision to sell the easement in 2003, the Council
voted in favor of the sale by a vote of six to one - the makeup of the
council had changed, and the six council members voting in favor
were also members of the LDS Church; the one opponent was
not.f45
There is further evidence of entanglement from the
statements or actions of other parties. Former City Councilwoman
Deeda Seed, a Council member when the first transaction was
140. Janofsky. supra note 30.
141. Scheidemrantle. supra note 123, at 1219-21 ("[R]eligious interference
with the political process is dangerous because it threatens the rights of the
members of religious groups lacking political power. The danger arises not
because religious interference is in and of itself evil, but because such
interference allows religious groups constituting a majority or those with
superior resources to exert excessive influence over the political process.")
(citations omitted).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
143. d.




made in 1999, felt that the deal was made unfairly. Mayor
Anderson addressed the City Council's attempt to bypass him after
he announced that he would be retaining the easement by stating,
The City Council and I have disagreed on a
number of things in the past three years, but
they have never taken such extraordinary steps
to somehow go around me on administrative
matters. Why would active, participating
members of the LDS Church do this when the
matter directly involves the church? I think the
answer is obvious.;
47
Another city councilman, who was affiliated with the
Church, said he often heard assertions that council members were
swayed by their religious views and did not deny that it could not be
a factor in issues involving the Church: "You belong to your
religion; it forms your core beliefs. It's hard not to have your life
reflect those beliefs. Are we puppets? No. But our general
attitude, certainly, is that we are not against the Church."
' '
48
There is further evidence, as seen above, that the Mayor
made a very late change in his stance on the relinquishment of the
easement, which would indicate an external influence on his
decision.14 The court in this case even noted that immediately after
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Main Street I, "Mayor Anderson and
the LDS Church engaged in a vitriolic and widely reported dispute
that, according to the Mayor, threatened to tear the City apart
along religious lines."'t5 As mentioned above, this type of religious
line-drawing is the concern to be addressed by use of the political
entanglement doctrine. 15
Of particular concern in this case are the allegations of
146. Heather May, Rocky: Give Church Plaza, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct.
15, 2002, at Al ("In March of 1999, the church agreed the plaza would be as
unrestricted as a public park. A month later, when the city council approved
the deal, the free speech restrictions had been mysteriously added.").
147. Janofsky, supra note 30.
148. Id.
149. See Main Street II, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1211-12 (D. Utah 2004).
150. Id. at 1209.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 126-30.
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political collusion between the LDS Church and the City,
specifically the powerful political influence of the former over the
latter. 52 While the court in Main Street II takes note of a number of
relevant circumstances while reciting the facts, it fails to account
for possible political collusion in its analyses of both the primary
effect prong of the endorsement test and the entanglement prong of
their test. 54 By excluding these facts in its later analysis, the court
omitted the central issue in this case from meaningful analysis -
whether the interaction between the LDS Church and the city
government before the sale, as well as the resulting transaction,
constituted political entanglement or altered the effect of the
transaction in the public eye.
Despite the fact that there was a clear secular purpose and a
benefit to the city, the easement was critical to the negotiations for
the initial sale of the land, and it was in the public's best interest to
have a right of way down its Main Street. As it now stands, the
LDS Church has the legal authority to restrict access to anyone it
chooses and to promote its own religious beliefs on the Plaza. This
has given them an inherently public area of the City, and while this
sale could ultimately be determined valid, the court's analysis does
not account for the evidence of political influence of the LDS
Church over the City.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND ANALYTICAL SUGGESTION FOR THE
COURT
There are two levels of criticism posed by this article. I
argue first that the hybrid test used by the court was misapplied.
The court should have more closely addressed evidence of collusion
between the LDS Church and the City in the time leading up to the
152. Main Street 1I, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1212 ("Plaintiffs characterize this
change of heart as an 'eleventh hour decision to change horses and relinquish
the easement' and occurring 'under the most unusual circumstances,' i.e.,
surrendering to the significant pressure brought to bear on him by the LDS
Church.").
153. See id. at 1209-13.
154. See id. at 1240-46.
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transaction in this case. The court should have also examined the
particular context of a governmental action that indicated a
preference for, or an endorsement of, one particular religion.
There was a large amount of evidence that indicated a significant
level of collusion between the LDS Church and the City and that
this collusion sent a message of endorsement.
The purposes for the political entanglement doctrine and
Endorsement test outlined above are important in analyzing the
implications of the court's failure to inquire further into the level of
collusion between the LDS Church and the City in this case. The
real danger that can arise from a powerful church holding
persuasive authority over a government stems not only from the
potential divisiveness of a governmental action, but also from the
idea that this action could represent "a fusion of governmental and
religious functions," which threatens governmental autonomy and
independent decision-making'1 There is also support for the
notion that "political division, along religious lines, when not
manufactured by the parties to a lawsuit, may serve as evidence that
political and religious functions have fused." ' ' Further, when
"battles divide legislators along religious lines, the religious
institutions with the most political power are likely to receive the
largest appropriations, to the detriment of less powerful groups."157
These principles are also in accord with those promoted by the
Endorsement Test - that one religion is not to be granted
preference or promotion. Whether couched in terms of "primary
effect" or "neutrality," the facts of Main Street HI merit an inquiry
155. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203. 222
(1963):
The wholesome 'neutrality' of which this Court's cases
speak thus stems from a recognition of the teachings of
history that powerful sects or groups might bring about
a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a
concert or dependency of one upon the other to the
end that official support of the State or Federal
Govermnent would be placed behind the tenets of one
or of all orthodoxies.
Id.
156. Scheidemantle, supra note 123, at 1212.
157. Id.
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into the true nature of this transaction.
The decision in Main Street H seems to suggest that the level
of collusion between a church and a local government carries very
little importance in an Establishment Clause case, and that there is
some uncertainty in the lower federal courts regarding the
appropriate standard for this type of case and how to uniformly
apply it. Such a decision contradicts the purposes of the political
entanglement doctrine and the endorsement test, as well as the
Establishment Clause that the tests are meant to help define.' 5" If
the Tenth Circuit upholds the decision in Main Street H,' it is
unlikely that any case to come before the court where there is a
high level of collusion (but where perhaps there is a secular
purpose, an arguable primary effect of non-endorsement, and no
administrative entanglement) will be found in violation of the First
Amendment. In this unique social context, with a very large
population of an influential religion, it is even more important to
safeguard against political influence by the Church. The above
evidence should have been at least sufficient to survive a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. However, while the hybrid test chosen by the
court was perhaps misapplied, that is not the end of the problem.
Even more troubling than the misguided analysis by the
district court in Main Street H is why the court's analysis went awry.
The district court's analysis is indicative of a much larger problem
with contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The
existence of three separate Establishment Clause tests, not to
mention the various hybrid tests, has created a state of confusion in
this area of law, in what has already been a very uncertain area. As
such, it seems as if a complete overhaul of this important area of the
First Amendment might be long overdue.
In penning one of the most famous metaphors in American
158. See Scheidemantle, supra note 123, at 1213 (arguing that the
political entanglement issue is important enough to be capable on its own of
striking down legislation, even if it passes scrutiny under the other prongs).
While this is not the view expressed by this essay, the inquiry initially required
by the political entanglement prong of the Lemon test has demonstrable
signifigance.
159. At time of publication, the oral argument before the Tenth Circuit
was scheduled on May 4, 2005.
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law, Thomas Jefferson wrote, "I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared
that their Legislature should 'make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,'
thus building a wall of separation between Church and State."""
From the period of this early recitation and the adoption of the Bill
of Rights, there has been dispute regarding the true reach of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment.
"Indeed, many believe the Court's modern Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is in 'hopeless disarray."'' l(  Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has been described as having "produced only
consistent unpredictability'' and characterized as
" embarrassing"- hardly a ringing endorsement of the state of the
law. In recent years, the Supreme Court has had trouble defining
the standard by which claims of establishment of religion should be
adjudicated. As a result, there is tremendous uncertainty in this
area of law '5 and little guidance as to the proper approach for
analyzing alleged Establishment Clause violations. In Main Street
HI, the District Court for the District of Utah rendered a decision
that demonstrates this state of uncertainty.
In light of all of the circumstances described above, it seems
160. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting the
then President Jeffersons's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association dated
Jan. 1, 1802). See also Alberto B. Lopez, Equal Access and the Public Forum:
Pinette's Imbalance of Free Speech and Establishnent, 55 BAYLOR L. REV.
167, 168-71 (2003) (noting that the metaphor. which has become "enshrined in
the pantheon of legal prose," demonstrates the politicization of religious
faith).
161. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542. 551 (10th Cir. 1.997)
(quoting Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819. 861 (1995) (Thomas. J.,
concurring)).
162. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
163. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 IJ.S. 578, 639 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
164. See supra note 43.
165. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (commenting that
"substantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order").
See also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 419 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(criticizing Lemon test as being too formalistic).
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necessary for the court to reevaluate the importance of evidence of
collusion between church and government in the time leading up to
a transaction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals should caution
using a definitive test, as the state of the Establishment Clause is
uncertain. Instead, the court needs to consider the particular facts
of this case and the potential for collusion and the public perception
that may follow. Such collusion conveys a message of preference
for a particular religion to the public, particularly in this
sociological setting. It remains quite possible that the transaction in
this case was valid, as there were legitimate secular purposes for the
transfer of the easement. But the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
needs to take caution under these circumstances and require that
the district court acknowledge and examine the issue of collusion
between the LDS Church and the City, either in terms of
entanglement or endorsement.
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